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Article 3

MODERN AND ANCIENT LEGAL PRAGMATISMJOHN DEWEY & CO. VS. ARISTOTLE:* II

V.
Dewey on the Courts
Dewey's article, "Logical Method and Law," published
in 1924,12 did more, I think,'
than anything written in
English up to that time to illuminate the subjects of (1)
how lawyers reason when preparing themselves to bring
about decisions favorable to their respective clients, and
(2) how courts reason both in reaching their decisions and
in publicly justifying them. But there and elsewhere Dewey
has said next to nothing (a) of the methods employed
(often successfully) 'by lawyers to sway courts non-rationally, and especially of (b) the judicial problem of determining witnesses' credibility. These grave deficiencies in
Dewey's exposition are apparent in his description of lawyers' reasoning. The lawyer, writes Dewey in his 1924
article:

124

...begins with a conclusion he intends to reach, favorable to
his client of course, and then analyzes the facts of the situation to find material out of which to construct a favorable
statement of facts, to form a minor premise. At the same
time he goes over recorded cases to find rules of law employed in cases which can be presented as similar, rules
which will substantiate a certain way of looking at and interpreting the facts. And as his acquaintance with the rules
of law judged applicable widens, he probably alters perspective and emphasis in selection of the facts which are to form
his evidential data. And as he learns more of the facts of
the case he may modify his selection of rules of law upon
which he bases his case.
*Part I of this article appeared in the Winter issue of the Lawyer, 25 NoRE
DAME LAWYER 207 (1950).
122

123
124

10 CoRN. L. Q. 17 (1924).
See FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MiND 100, 337 n. 1 (1930).
Dewey, supra note 122, at 23.
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That is admirable as a description of a lawyer's reasoning, when preparing for trial, on his tentative assumption
that he may be able to prove facts which will support a
theory advantageous to his client; admirable, too, as a
description of a lawyer drafting a brief for an upper court,
after the trial court has rendered a decision at the trial, in
the course of which the trial court has already determined
the facts. But one would like to ask Dewey these questions:
In a case in which (as in most cases) witnesses will give
conflicting testimony, what are the "facts," the "evidential
data," before the trial has begun, before the trial court has
heard that testimony? At that stage, are there such facts,
waiting as "data," ready-made, from which the lawyer can
pick and choose? Patently not.
Consider, for instance, the first trial of Alger Hiss. Could
the prosecutor or Hiss' lawyer, when preparing for trial,
count on any fixed "data" as constituting the "facts of the
case"? Of course not. The "facts," for purposes of the
decision, consisted of the future reactions of the jury to
the disagreeing witnesses. Unless and until the jury
brought in a verdict, the "facts," for that purpose, were unknown and unknowable. Since the members of the jury
were not unanimous in their reactions, there was no verdict
and therefore no judicially determined facts came into
existence. If the jurors had been unanimous - either as to
innocence or guilt - then, for the first time, the "facts,"
judicially, would have come into being. As it was, the jury
was dismissed, and a new trial was held; not until the second jury reported its verdict were the "facts" judicially determined. Had the case been tried before a trial judge
without a jury,'25 there would have been no such "facts,"
in that sense, until the judge announced his decision. In
short, the "facts," in such a lawsuit, are the judicially determined facts; they are non-existent before the trial court's
125 Hiss, with the approval of the court and the consent of the Government.
could have waived a jury and gone to trial before a judge without a jury.
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decision. And their judicial determination - by the jury
in a jury trial or by the judge in a non-jury trial - is a
product of human factors many of which are hidden from
scrutiny, and the operations of which are therefore often
unforeseeable.
For one fleeting second, Dewey seemed to sense this difficulty: Referring to the "acceptable premises" of the lawyer's reasoning, Dewey said that, "Of course the judge and
jury have eventually to do with their being accepted." Only
in that brief remark did Dewey mention the trial court's
fact-finding. Not a word did he utter about conflicting
testimony, about the efforts of the opposing lawyers to persuade the trial judge or jury to believe one witness rather
than another, or about the appeals to the trial judge's or
jury's emotions.
Dewey has not attempted to describe the decisional process in a jury case; had he done so, he would surely have
altered his notions of judicial logic. But, in 1910, in his
book, How We Think, he specifically discussed the logic of
a trial judge in a jury-less case. There Dewey said that,
for the judge at "the trial," the "consideration of a legal
dispute" involves two problems: (a) "sifting the evidence"
- the "determination of the data that are important in the
given case" - so as to arrive at the "facts," and (b)
"selecting the rules that are applicable" - -the "law" of the
case. The phrase "sifting the evidence" should have pushed
Dewey into searching reflection on the difficulty for the trial
judge in deciding which of the stories told in court by the
several disagreeing witnesses- is to be taken as true. But
Dewey did not touch on that difficulty. His concern was
solely with "relevance." He declared that "to be a good
judge is... to know what to eliminate as irrelevant." With
that in mind, Dewey concluded that the two judicial tasks
he had singled out - i.e., that of "sifting the evidence" and
that of "selecting the rules" - are "strictly correlative,"
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with "the answer to each depending upon the answer to the
other." I think that Dewey's conclusion is correct - once
some part of the testimony is accepted as true. But the
trouble, un-noted by Dewey, is that there is more to trial
court judging than solving this double-jointed problem of
relevance: A "good judge" is indeed one who knows "what
to eliminate as irrelevant." A "good trial judge," however,
must also know -

as well as any human being can know

-

how to sift the true from the false or inaccurate testimony.

1 26

Because Dewey failed to consider that important phase
of a trial court's task, he also necessarily underestimated
the difficulties of utilizing precedents. A decision, he said,
creates "a presumption

.

.. in favor of a similar interpreta-

tion in other cases where the features are not so obviously
unlike as to make it inappropriate." 127 What does Dewey
mean by "not so obviously unlike"? He means that the
"relevant" facts in the later cases are not too dissimilar from
those in the earlier cases. But how, in each of the cases,
the earlier .and the later, the "relevant" facts are selected
from conflicting testimony Dewey does not intimate. 2 '
In 1938, in his book, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry,
Dewey gave an analysis of judicial logic, at a trial, as
illustrative of the logical process in general. Logic he there
defined as a process of "inquiry" which occurs when a "situation" is "problematic." In any such inquiry, he said, there
are two kinds of operations "in functional correspondence
with each other": (1) The first kind - "the technique...
of observation" - supplies, he said, the "facts of the case."
126 I happen to believe that a jury is not as well equipped to do such
sifting as a well-trained, intelligent, conscientious trial judge. As to juries, see
Chapters 8 and 9, FRANx, CouRTs oN TFAL (1949). As to trial judges, see id.
at 146-85; as to the need for special education of future trial judges, see id. at
247-53.
127 DEwEY, How WE Tmax 107 (1910).
128 See Chapter 23, FRANK, CoumRS ox TRiAm (1949); id. at 328. See also
the discussion of Cook and Levi in the first installment of the present article.
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(2) The second kind - ideas or concepts representing possible solutions of the problem - functions "in directing
observation and obtaining relevant facts." For the "facts"
are "not self-sufficient"; they "are selected . . . for a purpose, namely a statement of the problem.. ."; they acquire
"significance only in relation to ideas." Thus observation
"locates and describes the problem," while the idea "represents a possible mode of solution." The "ideas" not only
"instigate and direct . . . operations of observation" but
also "organize all the selected facts" in arriving at a solution.
As an illustration of this process of inquiry, Dewey used
the "judgment of a court in settling some issue which, up
to that point, has been in controversy. The occurrence of
a trial at law," he said, "is equivalent to the occurrence of
a problematic situation which requires settlement. There is
uncertainty and dispute," he said, "about what shall be
done because there is conflict about the significance of what
has taken place, even if there is agreement about what has
taken place as a matter of fact - which, of course, is not
always the case." The court's judgment is "the outcome of
inquiry conducted in the court-hearings." Dewey goes on,
as follows, to show the two kinds of operation in a trial: 129
[1] On the one hand, propositions are advanced about
the state of facts involved.

Witnesses testify to what they

have heard and seen . . . This subject-matter is capable of
direct observation and has existential reference. As each
party to the discussion produces its evidential material, the
latter is intended to point to a determinate decision as a
resolution of the as yet undetermined situation. The decision
takes effect in a definite existential reconstruction. [2] On
the other hand, there are propositions about cbnceptual
subject-matter; rules of law are adduced to determine the
admissibility (relevancy) and the weight of facts offered
as evidence. The significance of factual material is fixed by
the rules of the existing judicial system; it is not carried
129

(1938).

See Chapters

6

and 7, DEw'EY, Looxc, THE THEORY Or INQuiRy 121
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by the facts independent of the conceptual structure which
interprets them. And yet, the quality of the problematic
situation determines which rules of the total system are selected. (Emphasis partially supplied.)

Before criticizing this analysis of the judge's decisional
process, it may be well to quote Cairns' more simply worded
rephrasing of Dewey's analysis: 130
The judge begins with an indeterminate or problematic
situation. An important step is for the judge to determine
exactly what the problem is. To ask the right question,
Bacon long ago observed, is the half of knowledge. The way
in which the problem is conceived decides what specific suggestions are entertained and which are dismissed; what data
are selected and which rejected; it is the criterion for relevancy and irrelevancy of hypotheses and conceptual structures. Upon the determination of the problem, a possible
solution then presents itself as an idea. Ideas are the anticipated consequences or forecasts of what will happen when
certain operations are carried out. Various activities are
involved in executing the operations, and in the process the
problem may be further delimited. Eventually, the ideas that
represent possible modes of solution are all tested and a final
conclusion is reached . . . The vital point is that the judge
does not first find the facts, then ascertain and develop the
law, and then apply the results to the facts. Hi does even
not know what the operative facts of the case are until the
apparently relevant facts have been tested in conjunction
with the ideas that forecast the solution. He does not know
what the law is until he has settled upon the solution which
he believes he will accept. At that point the judge then
"finds the law," and it may well be that the provisional
solution will have to be abandoned if the "law" as the judge
"finds it" will not permit the proposed solution. The judge
will then seek a different solution, and again "find the law."
This process will continue until a solution is found which
will withstand the test of the law, the facts and any other
-materials the judge deems relevant.

Cairns (who applauds Dewey's analysis) brings out clearly Dewey's primary emphasis on "relevance" in the judge's
job of "finding" the interacting "facts" and "law" (i.e., the
rules).
Cairns' description, however, does not bring out
130

CAnRNs,

LEGAL Pmrsom" rROm PLATO TO HEGEL 238-39 (1949).

NOTRE, DAME LAWYER

the following remarkable feature of Dewey's analysis:
Dewey, in his general discussion of logical inquiry, asserts
that "the facts of a case" rest on "observation." In his
specific discussion of a trial court at work, Dewey writes
as if "the facts" - when there is not "agreement about
what has taken place as a matter of fact" - are "capable
of direct observation." But what is the character of this
"direct observation"? According to Dewey, it comes in
part from witnesses who "testify to what they have heard
and seen." But can this be called "direct observation" by
the trial judge, by the man who is called upon to ascertain
the "facts"? Of course not. The trial judge's only "direct
observation" consists of his direct observation of the witnesses. Can he thereby, with approxim.te adequacy, ascertain the "facts"? To do so, he would have to learn how
competently those witnesses had conducted their "direct
observations." Can he do so? The answer to that question
is basic. The entire process of adjudging "relevance," in
terms of rules which interact with "selected facts," comes to
nothing unless the judge can learn whether, and to what
extent, the witnesses accurately conducted (and accurately
reported to the judge) their "direct observation" about
what happened in the past. Dewey does not discuss -the
two weakest spots in the judicial "inquiry": (a) The defects in the witnesses' "direct observations." (b) The defects in the trial judge's methods of determining the reliability of the witnesses.
Dewey's analysis, excellent as far as it goes, is, then,
inadequate because it does not go far enough: Dewey (like
Cook and Patterson) seriously over-simplifies by omitting
the difficulties of the process by which the trial judge obtains "facts," some of which he then selects as "relevant."
But even that criticism is too restricted. Dewey's picture
of the trial judge leaves out of account the trial judge's
"sovereignty" - "his discretion" to choose (as he will) to
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believe or disbelieve parts of the oral testimony. This
"sovereignty" allows the judge a wide range - far wider
than that described by Dewey - in which to roam in
"finding" facts to justify the judge's tentatively projected
judgment. When Dewey depicts the judge as, in effect,
confined to picking out "relevant" facts from among those
already somehow determined, the picture pretty well fits an
upper court judge's operations. But a trial judge in most
cases (i.e., cases where the testimony is oral and conflicting) can select (or purport to select) "relevant" facts from
any substantial portion of the oral, but conflicting, testimony.'31 This latitude - a product of the necessity of
conferring upon the trial judge the power to determine credibility - adds a dimension to judicial "logic" that Dewey
neglected. 132
It is all too obvious that Dewey was thinking primarily
of cases in which the determination of testimonial reliability
has no importance. He was apparently thinking either of
(a) cases in trial courts where there is no dispute about the
evidence or (b) cases in upper courts where the facts are
"given" - "given" to the upper courts because, as we saw,
the trial courts have previously "found" them and because
those "findings" are usually accepted by the upper courts."a"
In his book, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry, Dewey also
considered history-writing, i.e., "historical inquiry" and
"historical judgments." "I He noted that "historical propositions" are "inferred constructions" made by historians,
and that these propositions, thus founded on inference, are
not "directly given," since they derive from "selections" by
131

Subject only to the condition that it was properly received in evi-

dence.
It added what I have called the trial judge's "gestalt."
Warning: After the first installment of this article was written, I wrote an
opinion for our court which, in the light of United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 333 U. S. 364, 394-96, 68 S. Ct. 525, 92 L. Ed. 746 (1949), points out some
of the niceties of the position of an upper federal court with respect to the findings of fact made by a federal trial court. See Orvis v. Higgins, .F. (2d) .... (2d
132

132G

Cir. 1950).
133

DEWEY, LooIc, THE THEORY OF INQUIRY 230 et seq. (1938).
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the historian from "selections" which, in turn, were "made
by the people of the past." Those people of the past, says
Dewey, in arriving at their selections, relied on memory,
"which is selective," and on their own "selective evaluations" of the events that they observed; moreover, there
are "things they forgot to tell." It is regrettable that
Dewey, in his analysis of courtroom "inquiries," did not see
(1) that they, too, are "historical inquiries," with the same
dependence on inferences by trial judges functioning as
historians, those inferences being far from "directly given";
and (2) that judicial "inquiries" suffer from the same
weakness of dependence on the testimony of witnesses, who
often made defective observations and whose memories are
selective and frequently fallible.' 34
The serious flaws in Dewey's thinking about the courts
are the more remarkable because, a year or so before the
appearance of Dewey's How We Think, a far less able
philosopher, Muensterberg, in his book, On the Witness
Stand, had pointed up ...some of those inescapable difficulties, in the process of trial court ascertainment of facts, on
which I have been dwelling - difficulties that cannot be
avoided by that judicial capacity for selecting "relevant"
facts which Dewey depicted as the essence of that process.
Muensterberg related many instances in which several honest witnesses, all present at the occurrence of an event, had
given flatly contradictory testimony about that event. He
underscored the "great differences between men's perceptions," in sight, in taste, in hearing, in estimates of distances; the distortion of observation through "fluctuating
attention" or through the "inhibitory influences which result
from excitements and emotions"; the "different types of
memory" possessed by different witnesses; the way in
which "mixtures of truth and untruth, combinations of
134
135

(1930).

To say nothing of witnesses' perjury and bias.
See quotations in FRANx, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 108-09, 338 n.6
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memory and illusion, of knowledge and of suggestion" affect
witnesses' recollections; the fact "that, every day, errors
creep into the work of justice through wrong evidence which
has -the outer marks of truth and trustworthiness." He
noted, too, that the "dangerous susceptibility" of jurymen, when appraising contradictory testimony, "interferes
with the purpose of justice."
Not that Muensterberg was at all profound; others before him had more competently discussed these defects of
courtroom ways; and he jumped too easily to the conclusion
that those defects would vanish if only the courts availed
themselves of the services of laboratory psychologists. Yet
Dewey's contributions to legal thinking would have been
much improved if he had seriously pondered what Muensterberg said, instead of listening exclusively to the academic legal pundits. Those pundits misled Dewey, kept him
from applying to the workings of the courts his own knowledge, as a psychologist, of the fallibilities of human perceptions and memories.' 36 (In his writings on the subject
of education, he has been mindful of those fallibilities. He
would scorn, as psychologically superficial, an approach to
education resembling his own approach to the way courts
function.)
Sheldon describes one of Dewey's main philosophic theses
thus: "True knowledge or truth is a plan that can be
carried out; false knowledge or error is a plan that cannot.
If you tried to cut with a pencil or write with a knife, the
plan would fail. There lies the difference between truth and
error." 137 Judged by that standard, much of Dewey's pro-

nouncements about the judicial process is in error: his theory
or "plan" resembles that of writing with a knife.
136 Another American philosopher, Otto, has written an interesting paper

discussing the way in which witnesses' fallibilities may lead to erroneous therefore unjust -

decisions.

L. &. CRnmnqoLoGy 98 (1918).
137

29, 31.

and

Otto, Testimony and Human Nature, 9 J. CRUL

Sheldon, The Conquest of Dualism, New Republic, Oct. 17, 1949, pp.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

VI.
Aristotle as "Pragmatist"
Dewey, articulating his own theory of the proper relation
of theory and practice, has compared his views with those of
Aristotle. Dewey grants that, for his time and culture, many
of Aristotle's ideas were those of a genius; but Dewey has
tried to expose the shortcomings of those ideas when measured by modern pragmatist standards. It is my thesis that,
in respect of the judicial process, Aristotle, because he observed at first-hand what courts actually did, was a better
pragmatist than Dewey and than those of Dewey's disciples
whom I have discussed.
It is not difficult to show, I think, that, as to certain
phases of court activities considered by both of them,
Aristotle anticipated Dewey. In his article, "Logical Method and Law," 138 Dewey said that "principles of interpretation do not signify rules so rigid that they can be . . .
literally and mechanically adhered to. For the situations
to which they are to be applied do not literally repeat one
another in all details ... ." "Statutes," he continues: 139
...
cannot at the very best avoid some ambiguity, which is
due not only to carelessness but also to the intrinsic impos-

sibility of foreseeing all possible circumstances, since without
such foresight definitions must be vague and classifications
indeterminate. Hence to claim that old forms are ready at
hand that cover every case and that may be applied by formal

syllogizing is to pretend to a certainty and regularity which
cannot exist in fact.
Now listen to Aristotle: 140
[The] equitable is indeed "just" but not equivalent to the
"legal." It is rather an improvement on the merely legallyjust. The reason is that every statute speaks in general

terms, but there are some cases upon which it is impossible
to make a universal statement which will be correct. In
138

10 CoRN. L.

139

Ibid.

140

NicoxAcHN,

Q.

17, 25 (1924).

ETmcs 5.10, 1137 b 11-29.
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those cases, then, in which it is necessary to speak generally
but not possible to do so correctly, the statute embraces only
the majority of cases, although well-knowing the possibility
of error, Nor is it the less correct on this account; for the
fault is not in the statute nor in the legislature, but in the
nature of the subject matter. For it is plainly impossible
to pronounce with complete accuracy upon such a subject
matter as human action. Whenever, then, the statute reads
in general terms, but a case arises which is not covered by
the general statement, then it is right, where the legislator's
rule is inadequate because of its over-simplicity, to correct
the omission which the legislator, if he were present, would
admit, and, had he known it, would have put into his statute.
That which is equitable, then, is just, and better than one
kind of justice, not better than absolute justice but better
than the error that arises from legal generality. This is in
fact the nature of the equitable; it is a correction of the
statute where it is defective owing to its generality.

Aristotle also wrote: ...
We saw that there are two kinds of right and wrong
conduct towards others, one provided for by written ordinances, the other by unwritten. We have now discussed the
kind about which the laws have something to say. The other
kind has itself two varieties ...The second kind makes up
for the defects of a community's written code of law. This
is what we call equity; people regard it as just; it is, in fact,
the sort of justice which goes beyond the written law. Its
existence is and partly is not intended 'by legislators; not intended, where they have noticed no defect in the law; intended, when they find themselves unable to define things
exactly, and are obliged to legislate as if that holds good
always which in fact only holds good usually; or where it is
not easy owing to the endless possible cases presented
.a lifetime would be too short to make out a complete list of
them. If, then, a precise statement is not possible and yet
legislation is necessary, the law must be expressed in wide
terms .. . Equity bids us to think less about the laws than
about the man who framed them, and less about what he
said than about what he meant.....
..

To be sure, Dewey deviates from Aristotle, especially in
phraseology; for the American philosopher stresses the functions of legal rules and principles as "tools" to be used in a
141

PmioRic 1:13, 1374 a 19-1374 b 13.
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"logic relative to consequences rather than to antecedents."
Essentially, however, I think that Dewey adds little to
Aristotle's legal insights. 4" My appraisal may come as a
shock to those who have read Dewey's criticisms of Aristotle.
(Here I have in mind, and for the next several pages I shall
discuss, Dewey's criticisms of Aristotle's thinking generally,
not of his legal thinking in particular.)
For, according to Dewey, Aristotle too sharply separated
theory and practice; this attitude, Dewey says, reflected
Aristotle's own social status as one of a class of free citizens
in a culture which gave that class freedom because it "had
a servile class as its substratum." This, Dewey asserts, led
to a snobbish attitude towards artisans, the workers, whose
activities left men like Aristotle free to devote themselves
to "higher things." 148
From this social situation, says Dewey, stemmed a glorification of the unchanging, the invariant, and a depreciation
of the practical.'
Knowledge - rational science - was
(for Aristotle as Dewey reads him) the learning about the
unchangeable: Nature was taken as "unchanging substance"; things that change were considered too unstable
to be subjects of knowledge in its most exact and complete
sense; truth, therefore, could not alter, and hence its objects
must be invariable; natural science thus dealt with eternal
and universal objects and therefore possessed necessary
truths. The Greeks, says Dewey, were keen observers of
nature, but in their science they did not use instruments
142 One of Dewey's admirers, however, has noted the surprising fact that
Dewey has never adequately acknowledged his indebtedness to Aristotle, although
Dewey might be described "as an Aristotelian more Aristotelian than Aristotle
himself." See Randall, Dewey's Interpretation of the History of Philosophy in
I TaE LIBRARY OF LIVING PHamosorn s 77, 102 (SchiIpp ed. 1939).
143 Dewey, Challenge to Liberal Thought, Fortune, Aug. 1944, p. 155, col. 1.
144 The summary and quotations in this paragraph are taken from D
Yzw,
Tan QUEST FOR CERTAINTY (1929) passim, and from Chapter 5, DEWEY, LoGIC,
THE THEORY OF INQUImR (1938).
In the latter volume, Dewey suggests that
Aristotle's "cassification-logic" derived from "'the class structure of the culture."
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to bring about changes in nature; they took "the material
of perception 'as is,'" and "depended upon thought alone."
Greek thought "acknowledged the presence of contingency
in natural existence" but "used this property of uncertainty
to assign to natural existence a lower status than that which
belongs to necessary Being."
True, says Dewey, the Greek thinkers did not separate
"activity" from "practice." But they "distinguished activity from action - that is, from making and doing. 'Pure
activity' was sharply marked off from practical action. The
latter, whether in the industrial or the fine arts, in morals
or politics, was concerned with an inferior region of Being
in which change governs.. . Pure activity is rational." It
followed, Dewey tells us, that with Aristotle there was "no
room for any logic of discovery and invention... Invention
of the new had no place. It had only its etymological meaning of coming upon something already there." "'
This description of Aristotle's views seems correct 146
in part. For Aristotle did say that the inventors of those
arts and sciences which do "not aim at utility" are "naturally regarded as wiser." 147 He did say that "the object
of scientific knowledge is of necessity," and is therefore
"eternal, for things that are of necessity in the unqualified
sense are all eternal" and "universal"; that such knowledge
is concerned with "things that are invariable"; that "art"
and "practical wisdom," since they deal with variable things,
are not the same as "scientific knowledge." 148 He did seem
to regard the scientist as but "a spectator of the truth." 149
He did declare that "happiness . . .must be some form of
contemplation." 150 He did maintain that the life of labor145

See Chapter 5, DEwEY, LoGIC, Tc E TioRY oF IQUIRY (1938).

146 But see McKeon, Aristotle's Conception of the Development and the
Nature of Scientific Method, 8 J. or THE HisToRY oF IDEAS 3 (1947).
147 METAPHYsics 1.1, 981 b 18-20.
148 Nic mAcH"AI ETEcs 6.3-7, 1139 b 22-1141 b 12.
149 Id. at 1.7, 1098 a 32. There he refers to the "geometer," which, I
take it, includes the scientist.
150 Id. at 10.8, 1178 b 31-32.
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ers, mechanics, tradesmen and husbandmen is "ignoble,"
and that the best form of state will not admit them to
citizenship, which should be accorded only to those who
have leisure by being freed from "necessary services." 151
Yet Dewey's characterization of Aristotle is so shaded,
omits so much, that I think it seriously inaccurate, indeed
unfair. For Aristotle recognized, and at length explained
how, even in the best political state, a citizen must engage
in some of the arts and also - employing "practical wisdom" - in many practical affairs. He maintained that
both the arts and "practical wisdom" - as distinguished
from "science" - involve human "choice" in coping with
variable things, i.e., things that do "not always happen in
the same way," "things that are in our power and are
brought about by our own [i.e., human] efforts." An art
relates to "making," to "contriving things that do nbt come
into being by nature." 152 It arrives at generalizations, based
upon experience. It "arises when from many notions,
gained by experience, one universal judgment about a class
of objects is produced." So, says Aristotle, it is "a matter
of experience" to have a judgment as to how this particular
man can be cured of a disease, and a similar judgment
about another particular man, while it is a "matter of art"
to generalize that the same treatment "has done good to
all persons of a certain constitution, marked off in a class,
e.g., to phlegmatic or bilious people when burning with
fever." 153
"Practical wisdom," as distinguished from the arts, writes
Aristotle, relates to "doing." But in both the arts and
"practical wisdom," where as distinguished from
"science" as he defines it - men make "choices," they employ "deliberation," as, for instance, about "questions of
medical treatment or of money-making" or "the art of navi151

POLITICS 3.5, 1278 a 8-10;

152 NicomAcHEAN
153

7.9, 1328 b 39-41.

Emics 3.2-3, 1112 a 19-1112 b 10.

MEAPHYSICS 1.1, 981 a 5-12.
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gation." The "less exactly worked out" matters are, the
"more doubt" that exists, the greater the need for deliberation. "Deliberation is concerned with things... in which
the event is obscure... indeterminate"; and "all deliberation is investigation." 154 The "man who is deliberating...
is searching for something and calculating." "Excellence
in deliberation" is "rightness with regard to the expedient
- rightness in respect both of the end, the manner, and
the time." 155

Here Aristotle seems very close to Dewey's notions of
the way men deal with "problematic situations," "' and of
the "logic of discovery." Indeed, throughout his treatment
of matters "practical," Aristotle seems to me to be refreshingly "modem" in his exposition of the need for an interaction of "theory" and "practice." Thus he writes that:157
...

in regard to action, experience seems in no respect in-

ferior to art, and we even see men of experience succeeding
more than those who have theory without experience. The
reason is that experience is knowledge of individuals, art of
universals, and actions and productions are all concerned with
the individual; for the physician does not cure man, but
"some particular person" who happens to be a man.

Consequently, if one "has a theory without the experience, he will often fail to cure; for it is the individual that
NrcorAcEAN Ermcs 3.3, 1112 b 5-10; 3.3, 1112 b 22-23.
155 Id. at 6.9, 1142 b 14-15.
156 Aristotle's notion of "deliberation," with its stress on "choice" and
doubts, is, I think, not unrelated to his notion of the irreducibility of individual
instances to rules.
It is interesting to compare his position with that of Kallen, a highly original
thinker, whose attitudes derive, in part, from Dewey and James. Kallen writes
that many thinkers unfortunately use the word "problem" so that their "problems seem to follow from -their solutions, not their solutions from their problems. The answers are all known in advance . . . and problem designates the
formal or systematic elaboration of the unproblematical . . . When the Greeks
first used the word, they meant by problem some thing or event thrown unexpectedly into experience, breaking up its coherences . . . interposing alternatives . . . . " It called "to the task of finding new and different ways of
going and getting on . . . . " The "happening of problems points to the reality
and power of freedom." KALT", LiBERAL Spnus 9-10 (1948).
157 METAP'xscs 1.1, 981. a 13-20.
154
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is to be cured." 1' Theory (knowing the "why" a "thing

is so") ' plus experience is usually better than mere experience; but theory alone may have little value. For
example, "While in general rest and abstinence from food
are good for a man in a fever, for a particular man they may
not be." "I For "each person to get what suits his case"
requires that the physician have "general knowledge of
what is good for every one or for people of a certain kind,"
but also that he has learned from experience, since "medical
men do not seem to be made by a study of text books."
Information about "how particular classes of men can be
cured and should be treated.. . seems useful to experienced
people, to the inexperienced it is valueless." 161
It surely sounds much like Dewey when Aristotle says
that "credit must be . . . given to theories only if they
accord with the observed facts"; 162 or, again, when he
writes that "the truth in practical matters is judged from
operations and life, for the decisive factor is to be found
in them," that a theory in such matters should be brought
"to the test of operations and life, and if it . . . disagrees
with them, we must suppose it to be mere theory." 163
Nor is it true that Aristotle invariably adhered to the
traditions of his social class: In regard to biology, he broke
through the tradition that that subject - intimate knowledge of which had theretofore been the possession of the
farmer, the huntsman, and the fisherman - was not proper
158
159
160

Id. at 1.1, 981 a 20-23.
Id. at 1.1, 981 a 20-24.
NICoEACHEF-A

ETnics 10.9, 1180 b 8-10.

161 Id. at 10.9, 1180 b 13-15; 10.9, 1181 b 2-7. Aristotle's frequent use
of the medical art and medical practices as examples is explained by the fact
that he was a son of a physician and had been brought up in contact with
physicians.
As to the "experimental" or "experiential" character of Greek medicine, and
its advanced combination of theory and practice, see, e.g., Singer, Medicine in
TEm LEGACY oF GR EE 202 (Winn ed. 1923); Singer, Ancient Medicine in
SCIECE AN CIvnIzATIxON 43 (Marvin ed. 1926).
162
163

oN TnE GmNEEATiON OF ANmTas 3.10, 760 b 31 et seq.
NICOxAcHAN ETrmcs 10.8, 1179 a 18-23.
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for a "gentleman." "I In that field - in which he pioneered
so brilliantly that Darwin remarked, "Linnaeus and Cuvier
have been my great gods, but they are mere schoolboys to
old Aristotle" - it is said of him:16 5
Where pure intelligence, power, grasp, insight are required,
no modem can surpass him. And he is great as an observer
too, and well aware that speculation must be tested by observation . .. Wherever you look in biology he is first and
midst and without end . . .Aristotle was in certain points
ahead not only of Harvey, but of all modem [biological]
science until about the year 1900.
In Novum Organum, Bacon said that "no weight" should
be given to the fact that, in Aristotle's book on animals,
there is "frequent dealing with experiments." For, Bacon
continues: 166
...he

had come to his conclusion before: he did not consult

experience, as he should have done, in order to frame his
decisions and axioms; but having first determined the question
according to his will, he then resorts to experience, and, bending her into conformity with his placets, leads her about like
a captive in a procession....
That criticism, read in the light of Aristotle's biological
studies, should perhaps be taken as praise. For it really
says that Aristotle approached "experience" with questions
in mind; and Aristotle's own biological writings show that
his method was to test out his questions by observation of
164 Thompson, Natural Science in TuE LEGACY or GREEcE 136, 143 (Winn
ed. 1923).
Even in respect to physics, Dewey has probably overstated the
effect of the Greek slave system. Cf. Clagett, Science and Its History, 18 A m.
ScHoLAR 236, 238-39 (1949): "Thus Farrington assures us that Greek science
was born in Iona in the fruitful union of theory and practice, and that by the
fourth century B.C. the progress of a slave-based society was such that already
Plato, and to a lesser extent Aristotle, reflected the separation of theory and

practice and thus sounded the death knell of Greek science. It should be
pointed out that, slave-based or not, the society of the succeeding centuries produced the great flowering of Greek science in the brilliant and deathless works
of Euclid, Archimedes, Aristarchus, Appollinius of Perga, Eratosthenes and Hipparchus. And whatever the reason for the decline of Hellenistic society, much
more evidence than has been previously advanced will be necessary to show
that slavery was an important factor in the decline of Greek science."
165 Thompson, Aspects of Biological and Geological Knowledge in Antiquity in Scrq .c AN Cr
TiTnox 72, 79, 81-82 (Marvin ed. 1926).
166

See Aphorism 63, BACON, Novux ORGANUM (1620).
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"experience." "I See, for example, the following passages in
his treatise On the Generation of Animals: 168 "Such appears to be the truth about the generation of bees, judging
from both theory and from what are believed to be the
167 McKeon, in a fascinating discussion of the "logic of discovery," points
out that Bacon's suggestion of the use of that sort of logic was criticized in the
Nineteenth Century as an effort to carry over a method of invention from the
"cross-questioning methods of the law courts."
McKeon goes on to show that the Scholastic logicians, whose work Bacon
scored as "purely verbal . . . in turn had learned from Boethius to repeat
Cicero's distinction of logic into two parts, invention and judgment, and to
find the great virtue of Aristotle in his discovery and development of the logic
of invention . . . The Roman's philosophy in turn is a more simple practical
adaptation of Aristotle's rhetoric and Socrates' cross-questioning elenchus, both
of which have obvious derivations from legal procedure." McKeon, Democracy,
Scientific Method and Action, 55 ETHICS 235, 251-52 (July 1945).
For Cicero's discussion of Aristotle and "invention," see Cicero, On Topics,
in 4 CicERO's ORATIONS 459-60 (Bohn ed. 1852), and Cicero, The Treatise on
Rhetorical Invention in 4 CIcERO's ORATrONS 241 (Bohn ed. 1852).
Bacon, prejudiced against Aristotle as depicted by some of the Scholastics,
was closer than he knew to the real Aristotle. Morris Cohen, somewhat similarly, reacts unfairly to a one-sided version of Bacon's contribution to the advancement of science. See, e.g., COHEN, A PnREAcE TO Loozc 135, 155 (1944),
where he refers to "the Baconian method of accumulating empirical facts without hypotheses or anticipation of nature." No doubt Bacon did advocate such
a method. But he also underscored the idea that man should "put nature to
the question"; and any such question is an "hypothesis or anticipation of nature." I hereby apologize to Bacon for having glibly voiced another view in
my book, FoRAsx, LAW ANzDTHE MODERN Mnm 337 n.4 (1930) (where I also
overlooked what Bacon had said of "equity" in his Advancement of Learning).
Harvey's remark concerning Bacon, "He writes philosophy . . . [i.e., science]
like a Lord Chancellor," is quoted by Morris Cohen as settling Bacon's hash
with respect to scientific thinking. Harvey's remark was interpreted by de
Morgan as a reference to "the legal character of Bacon's notions" of science.
See I Dr MORGAN, A Buvoor OF PARADOXES 78-79 (2d ed. 1915).
Collingwood writes: "Francis Bacon, lawyer and philosopher, laid it down
in one of his memorable phrases that the natural scientist must 'put Nature to
the question' . . . What he was asserting was two things at once: first, that the
scientist must take the initiative, deciding for himself-what he wants to know
and formulating this in his mind in the shape of a question; and secondly, that
he must find means of compelling nature to answer, devising tortures under
which she can no longer hold her tongue." CorLLNGwooO, THE IDEA OF HISTORY
269 (1946). See also, id. at 237, to the effect that "natural science finds its
proper method when the scientist, in Bacon's metaphor, puts nature to the
question, tortures her by experiment in order to wring from her answers to his
own questions ... .
See Book 5, Chapter 3, BACON, ADVANCEMENT OF LERuNNG (1605), for a
discussion of "prudent questioning" as "a kind of half-knowledge" and as an
aid to man in the "art of discovering" (since "we are masters of questions").
168 3.10, 760 b 27 et seq.
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facts about them. The facts, however, have not yet been
explored sufficiently. If ever they are, then credit must be
given rather to observation than to theories, and to theories
only if they accord with the observed facts." Whitehead
remarks that Aristotle introduced "into sciences other than
Astronomy the much-needed systematic practice of passing
beyond theory to direct observation of details." 169
In divers contexts, Aristotle cautions that, when meeting
practical problems, theories - types, classifications, generalizations, rules and principles - are alone insufficient. He
says that "in practical life, particular facts count more than
generalizations." 17' He remarks that "none of the arts

theorizes about individual cases"; that is not their business,
since "individual cases are so infinitely various that no systematic knowledge about them is possible." 171 "Practical

wisdom" is not "concerned with universals only - it must
also recognize the particulars; for it is practical, and practice is concerned with particulars," with "the ultimate
particular facts." 172 The "man of practical wisdom is one

who will act, for he is a man concerned with individual
facts... ." 17' In considering what is ethical: 174
'
...the whole account of matters of conduct must be giyen
in outline and not precisely. . . ; matters concerned with
conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity,
any more than matters of health. The . . . account of
particular cases is yet more lacking in exactness; for they
do not fall under any art or precept since the agents
[actors] themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate on the occasion, as happens also in the art of
medicine or of navigation.
169

WErazAD, ADVENTuRE oF IDFAs 128 (Pelican ed. 1942).

170 Rnromc 2.19, 1393 a 16-17.
171 Id. at 1.2, 1356 b 28-33. Cf. PHYsics 2.4, 196 b 28: "The possible attributes of an individual are innumerable."
172 NIcorAcamN ETHcs 6.7, 1141 b 15-16. Cf. Bacon, who (in giving a
list of "commonplaces suited to both sides of the question") said: "Generals are
to be construed so as to explain particulars." See Book 5, Chapter 3, BAcon,
ADVAwcmmqT or LEARNiNG (1605).
173 Id. at 7.2, 1146 a 7-9.
174

Id. at 2.2, 1104 a 2-9.
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In politics, "it is impossible that alf things should be
precisely set down in writing; for enactments must be universal, but actions are concerned with particulars." "I
All this has a special bearing on government, including
the conduct of the courts. "Political writers," comments
Aristotle, "although they have excellent ideas, are often im-

practical ....

,

176
"

In framing an ideal we may assume

what we wish, but should avoid impossibilities."' 177 We
"must pre-suppose many purely imaginary conditions, but
nothing impossible." 178 The "best" government "is often
unattainable, and therefore the true ... statesman ought to
be acquainted, not only with that which is best in the
abstract, but also with that which is best relative to circumstances." He should also "be able to find remedies for
the defects of existing institutions . .,, 179 Those "who aim
at knowing about the art of politics need experience as well"
as theory.18 ° Both are desirable, for "the details can best
be looked after" by a man "who has the general knowledge," i.e., knowledge of the general principles. 8 '
"Practical wisdom" in government has two parts: (a)
The first is "legislative wisdom." It is "practical wisdom." 182 For "laws are, as it were, the 'works' of the
political art.... 2' 1 (b) The second part consists of rendering "decrees" (e.g., decisions of particular lawsuits). It
"has to do with action," for "a decree is a -thing to be
carried out in the form of an individual act." 184 Legal
rules enacted by legislators "are prospective and general,"
175
176

PoxnTcs 2.8, 1269 a 11-12.

Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.

at
at
at
at

4.1,
2.6,
1.2,
4.1,

1288 b 35-36.
1265 a 17-19.
1252 b 39-40.
1288 b 25-28; 4.1, 1289 a 6-7.
180 NrcomAcnAx ETrcs 10.9, 1181 a 11-12.
181 Id. at 10.9, 1180 b 13-15.
182 Id. at 6.8, 1141 b 22-25.
188 Id. at 9.9, 1181 a 24.
184 Id. at 9.9, 1181 a 25-27.
As to Aristotle's emphasis on the importance
of differentiating (1) legislation and (2) specific decrees, see Chapter 12, FaArx,
IF Mas WERE ANGE S (1942).
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but judges "find it their duty to decide on definite cases
brought before them." The legislature must therefore leave
to the judge "questions as to whether something has happened or has not happened 185 - i.e., questions of fact which
relate to "things already done." 186
Since practical wisdom in such matters means that "things
have to be done," it deals with "particulars" which are "ultimates." These particulars must be attained by "intuitive
reason" which grasps "the variable fact." Such "practical
reasonings" call for men with "judgment,",- which "is the
right discrimination of the equitable" (the disposition to
"make allowances"). Men possessed of this capacity are
said to be "sympathetic judges." Their power to judge
equitably results from experience. Such practical wisdom
is not necessarily accompanied by "strict reasoning." That
goes to show, says Aristotle, that "we ought to attend to
the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of experienced
and older people" (those with practical wisdom) "not less
than to demonstration; for, because experience has given
them an eye, they see aright." 181
Putting this in modern terms, a decision based on an experienced "hunch" may be wiser than a logical decision by
an inexperienced man. That such, in effect, is Aristotle's
view he makes plain when he refers to:' 88
. . . the fact that, while young men become geometricians
and mathematicians and are wise in matters like these, it is
thought that a young man of practical wisdom cannot be
found. The cause is that such wisdom is concerned not only
with universals but with particulars, which become fa185 Rumomc 1.1, 1354 b 6-12.
186 Id. at 1.3, 1358 b 17.
187 NIcomA&.cEAa Esmcs 6.11, 1143 b 10-13.
188 Id. at 6.8, 1142 a 12-15. See also id. at 6.9, 1142 b 23, to the effect
that "it is possible to attain even good by a false syllogism."
Compare Patterson, Logic in the Law, 90 U. or PA. L. REV. 875, 896 (1942):
.. the task of formulating the opinion should be entrusted to the judge or
judges having the best logical talents - which are not necessarily accompanied
by the best ethical insights or the best political wisdom."
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miliar from experience, but a young man has no experience,
for it is produced only by length of time.

Which is to say that, although science (as Aristotle defines
it) can get along without experience, the art of government

cannot. And it should be noted that Aristotle says that the
studehnt of politics must study psychology." 9
Aristotle thinks experience is of major- importance in
government not merely on grounds of practical expedience.
He thinks experience essential to conduct: He writes that
"it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without
practical wisdom," that "the choice will not be right without
practical wisdom any more than without virtue." 19o And
he maintains that participation by citizens in government
is essential, that a man is not a real citizen unless he so
participates. 9 '
In short, Aristotle was no more an "Aristotelian" 192 than
is Dewey a "Deweyite." "I
Of course, Dewey differs from Aristotle at many points,
and especially with regard to the nature and methods of
science. Dewey says that "science is an art" and therefore
concerned with the practical.' 9 4 Aristotle would not have
agreed. But aside from science (in which young inexperienced men can be proficient, according to Aristotle), his
views are in considerable measure like Dewey's. As to what
Aristotle considered practical affairs - and notably government - he would have endorsed Dewey's criticism ...of
Kant's thesis that perceptions without concepts (sensations
without thoughts) are blind, and concepts without percep189 The "student of politics must somehow know the facts about the soul
. The student of politics, then, should study the soul.... "NIcoMACHA1N
Enics 1.13, 1102 a 18-23.
190 NicomAcnzAN ETHics 6.13, 1144 b 30-1145 a 5.
191 PoLucs 3.5, 1278 b 5; 3.11, 1281 b 2-9; 3.13, 1283 b 44.
192 In Dewey's sense of that term.
193 In Dewey's critics' sense of that term.
194 DEWEY, ExPE iENca AnD NATuRE 354 et seq. (1925).
195 DEwEy, INFLUENcE OF DARvxw
oN PHILOSOPHY 271-99 (1910).
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tions (thoughts without sensations) are empty. Dewey
comments on this thesis that - although "no one can fairly
deny that both sense and reason are implicated in every
significant statement of the world" - it is "unconvincing
because we are.., left with these two opposed things still
at war with one another, plus the miracle of their final combination." The solution of the apparent dilemma, says
Dewey, "reveals itself when we conceive of knowledge as a
statement of action, that statement being necessary, moreover, to the successful ongoing action." This view of the
need of interaction between theory and practice is Aristotle's
- as to all "variable" practical matters, including those
affecting government. It follows that in what Aristotle included in the realm of the practical - of human, social
affairs - Aristotle was a pragmatist. And in respect of
government he was far more pertinaciously so than Dewey.
Peculiarly does this appear when we compare their respective explorations of the work of the courts. Unlike
Dewey, Aristotle had direct acquaintance with courts in
action, because almost every free Athenian over thirty
served frequently as a judge, i.e., as a member of the popular courts which, in deciding cases, not only passed on issues
of fact but also interpreted and applied legal rules. For
that reason, Aristotle's political theorizing reveals an intimate knowledge of actual judicial operations. His discussions of "equity" and statutory interpretation - which influenced Roman, Continental-European, and Anglo-American theories and practice '

-

bore a direct relation to the

methods of the Athenian courts. So, too, did his exposition
of the notion - which has come down to us through James
Harrington and thence to John Adams - of a "government
of laws and not of men": Aristotle, in that context, under196

See Usatorre et al. v. The Victoria et al., 172 F. (2d) 434, 439-41 (2d

Cir. 1949).
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scored the unavoidability of delegating discretion to men,
desjite their human fallibilities. 97
Because Aristotle knew of his own knowledge what happened in the courts to a far greater extent than does Dewey,
Aristotle's theories about court-doings are more illuminating than Dewey's. Not only did Aristotle warn that, in
dealing with all phases of government, not excepting courts,
one cannot be an exact scientist; that, in courts, individualization is essential to justice; that judicial justice cannot be
achieved unless the legal rules are flexibly adjusted to the
unique circumstances of particular suits. 9 He went much
further than Dewey. And, although no one could have
urged more eagerly than Aristotle that legal rules should
conform to ethical ideals, he did not permit that eagerness
to blur his observation of court realities. Because his reflections are founded on what he saw for himself in the courts,
Aristotle's discussion of judicial "logic" is far superior to
Dewey's.
I must here break in to say that I, a rank amateur in philosophy and no Greek scholar, may have misinterpreted
Aristotle. By way of partial excuse, I suggest that perhaps
no one in our day can be sure that he always understands
an ancient Greek writer. As I have suggested elsewhere,
"Ancient Greek glassware, buried in the soil and excavated
after centuries, has acquired an iridescence not native to its
original condition. Something not unlike that metamorphosis often affects ancient Greek texts." 1"9 Nevertheless,
I grant that my reading of Aristotle may be inaccurate, not
only because of my unique deficiencies, but because it is true
of all men that what one gets out of an author often is, unavoidably, in considerable part what one puts in. We all do
IF MEN WraE ANGELS (1942).

198

See Chapter 12, FR~wu,
Of this, more later.

199

See FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 193 (1942).

197
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tend, in varying degrees, to pull non-existent rabbits out of
existing hats. 19 90 But to continue ....
VII.
Aristotle's Manual on How to Win Lawsuits
Nothing written by Dewey or by any legal Deweyite
(or for that matter by any other legal philosopher) remotely
resembles that large portion of Aristotle's Rhetoric which
constitutes a manual containing detailed practical advice
to litigants on how to win lawsuits. It shows that Aristotle
- who (as above noted) had said elsewhere that the student of government must study psychology, and who had
watched courts in action - thoroughly comprehended the
non-rational and irrational factors which often mightily
affect judicial decisions. His wishes, his ethical ideals, his
strong liking for rationality, did not deflect him from a
calm, detailed delineation of judicial actualities, no matter
how ugly and unethical. Here we have a model for modem
legal theorists - an ancient legal theorist informed by observation of practice. It is remarkable, and unfortunate,
that even those of our contemporary writers on "jurisprudence" who cite and quote Aristotle 200 have not reflected on
the full implications of the Rhetoric; 201 and the modern

writers of those treatises on "trial tactics" which resemble
Aristotle's manual do not theorize but borrow their legal
theories from our contemporary "jurisprudes." 202
199a For a more extensive discussion of this theme, see Frank, A Sketch of
an Influence in INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PxuosoPm:ES 189, 237-39
(1947); FR :, IF MEN W=RE ANGELS 234-35 (1942); KALLEN, ART AND Fa aom
1, 16-17 (1942).
200 See, e. g., Cardozo and Patterson.
201 This is true even of Cairns' unusually painstaking and thoughtful exposition of Aristotle's legal philosophy. See Chapter 3, CAIRNS, LEGAL PMLOSOPY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL (1949).
202 See, e.g., CuTLER, SuccEssFuL TRA
TAcTiCs (1949). See the suggested
explanation in FRAx, COURTs ON TRIAL 78 (1949).
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In the Rhetoric, Aristotle brings out clearly that, while
legal rules are necessarily "prospective and general," 203
courts decide "definite cases." 204 And each case, he says,
involves specific facts that happened in the past, "things
'already done." 205 He notes that "witnesses are concerned
with past events." 20' He recognizes that the truth about
those past events often cannot be reliably ascertained. More,
he makes no bones about disclosing that decisions frequently do not turn on the evidence: He says that, under an ideal
judicial system, each party to a suit would "in fairness
fight [his case] with no help beyond the bare facts," and
that "nothing .. . should matter except the proof of those
facts." 207 But Aristotle leaves his readers in no doubt that,
in the lawsuits he saw, "other things affect the result considerably." 208 He remarks that, in litigation, "unscrupulous
practices" are often employed. 20 9 Although it is wrong "to
pervert the judge by moving him to anger or pity" - since
the arousing of "prejudice, pity, anger and similar emotions
has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a
personal appeal to the man who is judging the case" 21o
nevertheless, in actual lawsuits, such appeals are often successfully made: Judges "often have allowed themselves to
be so influenced by feelings . . . that they lose any clear
vision of the truth. . . 211 Consequently, to protect himself,2 12 one who presents a just claim or defense must under203 R ErOImc 1.1, 1354 b 6. Here Aristotle is speaking of rules contained
in statutes, but his remark applies as well to all legal rules.
In PoLiTICS 4.1, 1289 a 15, he says that "laws" are "the rules according
to which the magistrates should administer the state."

In

the Rhetoric his point

is that, in judicial administration, those rules are administered in specific lawsuits.

204
205

RHETORic 1.3, 1354 b 7.
Id. at 1.3 1358 b 17; cf. id. at 1.1, 1354 "b 13-14.

206 Id. at 1.14, 1375 b 8.
207 Id. at 3.3, 1404 a 4-6.
208
209
210

Id. at 3.3, 1404 a 7.
Id. at 1.1, 1354 b 29.
Id. at 1.1, 1354 a 16-25.

211 Id. at 1.1, 1354 b 8-10.
212 Id. at 1.1, 1355 b 1-5.
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stand judicial realities:21 He must know the ways of
"working on the emotions of the judges ... . 214
Aristotle goes on, therefore, to tell in great detail how
this is. to be done. For instance, one should aim at obtaining the judge's "good will, or at arousing his resentment,
or sometimes at gaining his serious attention to the case, or
even at distracting it - for gaining it is not always an
advantage," so that sometimes one should "try to make him
laugh." 215 Aristotle advises what to do if one has evidence
in his favor - and what to do if one has not. In the latter
event, he says, one should, among other things, seek to
"discredit" his opponent or his opponent's witnesses. Again
and again, Aristotle tells of alternative devices, one or the
other to be used to fit the litigant's particular needs. For
instance, there is one way of presenting a case involving a
contract if the contract helps you, and another "if it tells
against" you. After describing a certain kind of argument,
he adds, "We are to make either such assumptions or their
opposites, as suits us best." 21 He explains at length the
several kinds of emotion and how to stimulate each of them.
He also explains, for several pages, the different emotional
reactions of old and young judges. But he carefully points
out that he is writing only of what will probably affect "men
of a given type," and not of any "given individual," because individuals are "infinitely various." 217
213 I have elsewhere suggested, Frank, Book Review, 52 YALE L. J. 934,
936-37 (1943), that Holmes' "bad man" thesis resembles what Aristotle says in
the Rhetoric. I think that, as Aristotle takes the "unruly" into account, he is
more penetrating than Holmes, who tended at times to emphasize the generalized
elements of the decisional process. As to Holmes, see Frank, Say It With Music,
61 H~Av. L. REv. 937-38 (1948); FRA1x, COuRns ON TRIAr 178 (1949).
214 RuHEORIC 3.1, 1403 b 12; cf. id. at 3.14, 1415 a 33 ("how" to excite
prejudice).
215 Id. at 3.14, 1415 a 34-37.
216 As to Aristotle's discussion of Natural Law in this context, see Frank,
Book Review, 57 HARv. L. Rav. 1120, 1124 (1944); FRAsN, CoURTS ox TRAL4L
358-59 (1949).
217 RHEroc 1.2, 1356 b 26-34; cf. Pusics 2.5, 196 b 28-29.
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The reader of the Rhetoric is never allowed to forget that
judges are human, all-too-human, and that uniformity is
not to be expected in their reactions. Since Aristotle is
discussing the Greek popular courts, in which usually witnesses did not testify orally, he says nothing of witnesses'
demeanor. But that witnesses are men, and that men are
fallible observers of events, Aristotle knows well. He writes
elsewhere, for instance, that the "organ which perceives
color, is not only affected by its object, but also reacts upon
219
it... 218 And he continues:
[We] are easily deceived respecting the operations of sense
perception when we are excited by emotions, and different
persons according to their different emotions . . .Thus, too,
both in fits of anger, and also in all states of appetite, all men
become easily deceived, and more so the more the emotions
are excited.

VIII.
Aristotle on the Avoidable and Unavoidable Sources of
Legal Certainty
The outstanding feature of Aristotle's legal philosophy is
that, as it does not confuse the actual and the ideal, it does
not seek to minimize legal uncertainty - whether desirable
or undesirable, preventable or unpreventable - by pretending that it is relatively unimportant, exceptional, not
vast in extent.
Aristotle, as I read him, reported two main categories
of legal uncertainty:
(1) Rule-uncertainty. This subdivides, in his writings, into:
(a) the undesirable and avoidable (i.e., poorlydrafted laws) ;220
218

ON DRaEAs 1, 460 a 23-24.

219

Id. at 1, 460 b 4-11.

220

In

RHtvrc, 1.1, 1354 a 33-35, and 1.1, 1354 b 11-13, he says that

"well drawn laws should themselves define all the points they possibly can and
leave as few as may be to the decisions of the judges . . . In general, the
judge should ... be allowed to decide as few things as possible."
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(b) the undesirable but unavoidable (i.e., laws
well-drafted but incapable of anticipating all
future particular situations, and therefore
necessarily and purposely vague); and
(c) the avoidable but desirable (i.e., laws sufficiently flexible to allow courts to do
"equity") .221
(2) Litigation-wnxertainty. Aristotle reported that, entirely aside from uncertainty in the legal rules, and in ways
that rules cannot possibly prevent, most legal uncertainty is
caused by the irrepressible presence in litigation of fallible
human characteristics.222
Aristotle did not commit the all-too-common fallacy of
identifying "necessary" and "sufficient" conditions, a simple
illustration of which is this: Man cannot live without salt,
for it is a necessary condition of human life; but it is obviously a fallacy to assume that salt alone suffices to sustain
man's survival. So, while rule-certainty is essential to legalcertainty, the latter cannot 'be had unless there is also
litigation-certainty - and, as Aristotle saw clearly, litigation-certainty seldom exists.
Nor did he - out of a longing to achieve more of legal
certainty than is humanly possible - put rule-certainty
and litigation-uncertainty in separate compartments. His
Rhetoric exposes their inextricable intertwinings - that,
for instance, the emotional reactions of judges often nullify
221 Some commentators seem to deny that Aristotle included (c); they
say that (c) is a misinterpretation of (b).
222 Warning: In one brief passage, R=EToRIc 1.1, 1354 a 19-28, Aristotle
suggests that at least one of the sources of "unruly" elements in litigation can
be eliminated; he there says that appeals to judges' emotions can be prevented
by "rules for trials which are now laid down in some states," i.e., rules restricting litigants to the bare presentation of the evidence and precluding them
from any discussion of "whether a thing is important or unimportant, just or
unjust." As, except for a reference, RuzroRc 1.1, 1355 a 1-3, to the fact that
"in many places . . . irrelevant speaking is forbidden in the law-courts," he
does not pursue this theme, one wonders whether he seriously believed that
such rules would substantially reduce the effects of emotional factors.
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precise legal rules.22 3 Many modern legal writers, as I said
earlier, do compartmentalize - even some of those who
pay some attention to litigation-uncertainty. 22 4 When they
thus compartmentalize, they artificialize; they separate
theory and practice, ideals and realities; and they cultivate
the illusion that somehow rule-certainty can guaranty legalcertainty, despite the strikingly uncertain outcome of most
lawsuits in which definite rules are applied.
Whenever I read the Rhetoric, I recall Judge Learned
Hand's complacency-disturbing remark, "I must say that, as
a litigant, I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything
else short of sickness and death." 225 As Aristotle knew,
men must often submit to the terrors of litigation. Its
dangers, chanciness and dread-inspiring character were obviously not to his liking. But he refused to substitute his
wishes for his eyesight.
He would be astonished, were he alive today, to hear it
said that an accuracy in narration, like his, of the unpleasant
truths about litigation means that the narrator has a preference for those unpleasant truths; that honest revelations,
like his, of the unavoidable "personal element" in decisionmaking constitute approbation of, or lend dangerous encouragement to, the vicious "personalized justice" of the
223 That study of the interpretation of statutes, for example, is arid when
not coupled with a study of trial court nullification of statutes, via "factfinding," see Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 Co. L. REv. 1259 (1947).
224 See, e.g., Barrett, Confession and Avoidance? - Reflections on Rereading
Judge Frank's Law and the Modern Mind, 24 NOTRE DAmm LAWvn 447, 454
(1949).
225 Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, 3
LEcruRns oN LEGAr. Topics 89, 105 (1926).

Several centuries earlier, Montaigne had said: "No judge has yet, thank
God, spoken to me as a judge in any cause whatever, whether my own
'or another'S, whether criminal or civil . . . I . . . will never, if I can help
it, place myself in the power of a man who can dispose of my head, when
my honor and life depend on the skill
of a lawyer more than on my innocence
. . . How many innocent people we have known to be punished, I mean without the fault of judges; and how many there are that we have not known of I"
See Book 3, Chapter 13 of MONTAIGNE, EssAYs (1588).
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Hitler regime."' It may well be imagined that, were he
now alive, Aristotle would reply to such comments somewhat like this:
It is shocking, of course, to see how this personal element
in justice has been shamefully exploited by totalitarian governments. They have put the best of things to the most
evil uses. 227 But that personal element, whether one likes it
or not, is an inherent part of the decisional process, under
any form of government. It is therefore folly to conceal its

presence in the working of courts in a democracy. To conceal it, indeed, is to ensure that it operates at its worst,
surreptitiously, without such intelligent ethical restraints as
experience and wisdom show us both can be and should be
imposed. Here, as elsewhere, we must distinguish the desirable and the possible. The wise course is openly to acknowledge the personal element, and then to do whatever can

practically be done to get rid of its evils and to bring about
its constructive uses.

For the rest, we shall have to put up

with it, however bad, as we do with ineradicable sickness and
death.
In sum, Aristotle did not shut his eyes, or seek to shut his
readers' eyes, to the human weaknesses which create obstacles to the just judicial administration of justice. He did
not suggest many specific means for overcoming those obstacles 2 8 But he believed that only by an honest facing
of the problem is it possible to solve it, so far as its solution
is possible. He had no fatuous notion that its solution lay
solely or chiefly in any elaboration or revision of rules, inspired by high ideals, for he knew that the major difficulties
arise from what I call the "unruly" factors in litigation.
In my bumbling way, I tried to follow in Aristotle's foot29
steps when I wrote:
226

See Barrett, supra note 224, at 449, 454 (1949).

227

See RHnroaic 1.1, 1355 b 3: "And if it be objected that one who uses

such power of speech unjustly might do great harm, that is a charge which may
be made in common against all good things except virtue, and above all against
the things that are most useful, as strength, health, wealth, generalship. A man
can confer the greatest of benefits by a right use of these, and inflict the greatest
of injuries by using them wrongly."
228 Except in the brief passage in RETOrc 1.1, 1354 a 19-28, discussed
supra note 222.
229 FRANx, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 3-9 (1942).
Earlier, in 1930, with
specific reference to the courts, I said: "No, the pretense that judges are without
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It is imperative that in a democracy it should never be
forgotten that public office is, of necessity, held by mere men,
who, of course, have human frailties. It is only where government officials are deemed to be semi-divine that people
have any excuse for ignoring the unavoidable personal factor
in government. It is for that reason that the belief that
government can ever consist of perfect creatures is alien to
a democracy. That false belief is the core of the philosophy
of dictatorship; it is the basis of "personal government" in
its most extreme and pernicious form. For, where "personal
government" is at its maximum, the effects on government
of the all-too-human personalities of government officials is
least open to discussion .. . To cover up the effects of their
personalities leads to the operation of their personalities in
the most sinister and damaging form. It develops concealed
personal government. It yields a government of men at their
worst - of men pretending to give us nothing but a government of self-operating laws. Here we arrive at . . . [a]
paradox: The thorough awareness that there is an unavoidable personal factor in government is the best way to reduce
to a minimum the bad effects of that personal factor . . .
Properly interpreted, the phrase "a government of laws, and
not of men" is of inestimable value. 230 Thus interpreted,
it means that [the effects of] the personal prejudices . . .
of government officers should be reduced, by statutory provisions and other means, to as narrow confines as is possible,
having due regard to the practical workings of the governmental functions involved . . . But to that end, legal machinery is not enough. This, too, is needed: The men who
operate that machinery must be men keenly alive to their own
prejudices, to their own human weaknesses, and, armed with
that self-knowledge, must discharge their obligations to our
citizens. And the citizens, also, must be watchful of the bethe power to exercise an immense amount of discretion and to individualize
controversies, does not relieve us of those evils which result from the abuse of
that judicial power. On the contrary, it increases the evils. The honest, welltrained judge with the completest possible knowledge of the character of his
powers and of his own prejudices and weaknesses is the best guaranty of
justice. Efforts to eliminate the personality of the judge are doomed to failure.
The correct course is to recognize the necessary existence of this personal element and to act accordingly . . . Improvement of the judicial process will be
possible only if the unavoidability of discretion and individualization is accepted.
The question is not whether judges should exercise the powers of discretion and
individualization. The only question is whether these powers are to be exercised
consciously and skillfully." FiAxK, LAW AND THE MODERN MiND 138, 362 (1930).
230 As to the historical genesis and meaning of the phrase, see FRANx,
IF MEN WERE ANGELS 190-211 (1942).
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havior of those officers. They must not go to sleep on the
phrase about a government of laws.

Concerning the courts, then, Aristotle, thanks to his far
more intimate acquaintance with judicial actualities, surpasses Dewey in recognizing the effects of practice on legal
theories and generalizations. It is deplorable that Dewey
did not intensively study the trial courts in action, and that
the legal thinkers from whom Dewey learned were upper
court addicts. For Dewey, well versed in psychology, if he
had closely observed many trials, would surely have perceived that, in considerable measure, the decisional process
in trial courts is a psychological process, and that much of
the improvement in judicial justice must stem from informed revision of our trial practices, based in part upon
careful study of the psychology of litigants, witnesses, juries and trial judges. (I note again that Aristotle said that
the student of politics must study psychology.2" 1 )
Ix.
The Trial Judge as Artist
I have elsewhere suggested that the trial judge (in a
non-jury case), in his reaction to his experience at a trial
when orally-testifying witnesses disagree, functions somewhat like an artist; that his reaction, a sort of "gestalt,"
has unique characteristics incapable of being accurately
reported in logical (or "scientific") form.232 I therefore
regret the more that Dewey did not study the trial courts,
since he has sagely insisted that scientific and artistic reactions, although partaking of common elements, are nevertheless importantly distinct. He writes: 33
The odd notion that an artist does not think and a scientific inquirer does nothing else is the result of converting a
NICOMACHBAN ETHICS 1.13, 1102 a 18-23.
232 See Frank, Say It With Music, 61 HAv. L. Rav. 921 (1948); FRANX,
CourTs ON TRIAL 170 et seq. (1949).
231

233

DEwEy, ART AS EXPERIMNCE 15-16, 84-85 (1934).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

difference of tempo and inference into a difference in kind.
The thinker has his esthetic moment when his ideas cease to
be mere ideas and become the corporate meanings of objects.
The artist has his problems and thinks as he works. But his
thought is more immediately embodied in the object. Because of the comparative remoteness of his end, the scientific
worker operates with symbols, words and mathematical signs.
The artist does his thinking in the very qualitative media he
works in, and the terms lie so close to the object that he is
producing that they merge directly into it . . . Science states
meanings; art expresses them ... The poetic as distinct from

the prosaic, esthetic art as distinct from scientific, expression
as distinct from statement, does something different from
leading to an experience.

It constitutes one . .. The poem,

or painting, does not operate in the dimension of correct
descriptive statement but in that of experience itself. Poetry
and prose, literal photograph and painting, operate in different
media to distinct .ends. Prose is set forth in propositions.
The logic of poetry is super-propositional even when it uses
what are, grammatically speaking, propositions. The latter
have intent; art is an immediate realization of intent.

Although I incline to agree with Mrs. Langer that it is
a mistake to talk of "the logic" of poetry or the other fine
arts,234 I would agree substantially with Dewey's statement.
Had he considered the trial judge's obligation to render
a decision resulting from his unique composite (or gestalt)
reaction after hearing conflicting oral testimony, Dewey
might well have revised his notion 235 that a judge's
"hunch" can always initiate an analysis of a logical kind
which will necessarily clarify his reasoning and expose its
roots to other persons. 3 (Aristotle, as I have indicated,
234

LANGER, PHILOSOPHY

IN A NEW KEY (Penguin ed. 1948).

235 See Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CoRw. L. Q. 17 (1924). See
also the discussion of Dewey's thesis in-Patterson, Logic in the Law, 90 U. OF PA.
L.

REv. 875 (1942),

and in

PATTERsON, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE

(2d

ed. 1946).
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Compare DEwEY, Qualitative Thought in PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZA"When it is said that I have a feeling, or impression, or
'hunch,' that things are thus and so, what is actually designated is primarily the
presence of a dominating quality in a situation as a whole, not just the existence of a feeling as a psychical or psychological fact. To say I have a feeling or impression that so and so is the case is to note that the quality in
question is not yet resolved into determinate terms and relations; it marks a
conclusion without statement of the reasons for it, the grounds upon which it
TiON 93, 100 (1931):
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Had Dewey recognized the
seemingly knew better.)
baffling nature of the trial judge's composite reaction the way it is often suffused with emotions stimulated by unconscious prejudices for or against some of the witnesses
or the lawyers or the parties to the suit - Dewey might
have reached this conclusion: A trial judge, no matter how
brilliantly logical his mind, and no matter how gifted he
may be in the capacity for lucid expression, frequently has
a "qualitative" experience which he cannot possibly translate into a "discursive" or logical form. That experience,
I think Dewey would have seen, may issue in a judgment
which sometimes "may find better expression" in a laconic
"ejaculation" than "in a long-winded disquisition," because
"no verbal symbols can do justice to the fulness and richness" of the trial judge's reaction, the "dominant quality" of
which is such "that translation into explicit terms gives a

partial and inadequate result."

237

Viewing the trial judge as one often engaged in something
which partly resembles an artistic process, Dewey, I think,
would drastically have modified his exposition of judicial
methods. He would have seen that the exposition should
have been limited, for the most part, to upper court judging.
On that basis, Dewey, I surmise, would have criticized as
gravely insufficient - because grounded on woefully insufficient observation of practice - the theories of such
men as Cook, Llewellyn, Cardozo and Patterson.
rests. It is the first stage in the development of explicit distinctions. All
thought in every subject begins with just such an unanalyzed whole."
237 The quoted phrases are from Daway, Qualitative Thought in PnosOPRY AND CIVILwzATION 101-02 (1931). Perhaps, however, I am misinterpreting
Dewey. For, since he depicts the artistic process as essentially "communication,"
he might be impatient with the notion that the trial judge, as artist, ever has
had an incommunicable experience which shapes his decision. Cf. DEwEY, ART
AS EXpER, NCE (1934); KALLEN, ART AND FREEom 914-15 (1942).
Warning: The reader, I trust, will not mind my use of the italicized word
"sometimes." I am referring to a large subject, briefly discussed in the first installment of this article, and more extensively discussed in Chapter 12,
(1949), and in Frank, Say It With Music, 61 HARv.
FRANX, COURTS ON TiA.
L. REv. 921 (1948). I there advocate the requirement that a trial judge shall
make and publish special findings of fact, but I suggest that often those findings
do not, because they cannot, adequately express the trial judge's composite
(gestalt) reaction to his experience at the trial.
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X.
The Reality of the Uncertain
With a few verbal changes, the following remarks of
Dewey might be applied to those legal thinkers:2 .
Any philosophy that in its quest for certainty ignores the
reality of the uncertain in the ongoing processes of nature
denies the conditions out of which it arises. The attempt
to include all that is doubtful within the fixed grasp of that
which is theoretically certain is committed to insincerity and
evasion, and in consequence will have the stigmata of internal
contradiction. (Emphasis supplied.)

In part at least, Aristotle would have agreed. For, as
Dewey admits, Aristotle "acknowledged the presence of
contingency in natural existence." Aristotle said that in
physical nature there is something lawless, something "accidental"; that chance is a true part of reality, not merely a
name for human ignorance; and that, consequently, individual things occur which science cannot explain.2"9 This recognition of partial indeterminism in the physical realm ties
in with Aristotle's departure from that social and political
regimentation advocated by Plato in his Laws, and with
Aristotle's conception of "equity." 240
The Individualizationof Lawsuits:
It also ties in with Aristotle's espousal of what today
we call "individualization" in the judicial treatment of lawsuits. There Aristotle pointed the way, a way that today
238

DEwEY, TnE QUEST FOR CERTAinTY 244 (1929).

239 See, e.g., MF-rApntysics 6.2-3, 1026 b 24-1027 b 14, and 11.8, 1064 b
30-1065 a 6; PHysics 2.5, 196 b 10 et seq., and 2.7, 199 a 35-199 b 7; Rn-TRIc
1.10, 1369 a 31-1369 b 5; cf. ON GENERATION AND CORRUpTIoN 2.11, 337 b 10
et seq.

See the discussion in PEsacE, CHANcE, LOVE AND LoGic 180 (1923); MEF.,
19H CENTURY 4-5 (1936); FAN'x, FATE AND
FRaDOm 95, 119, 324, 355n.5, 361n.19 (1945); CAmNs, LEGAL PHnmosopn FRom
MovEMENTs oF THOUGHT 3N TH
PLATo TO HEGEL 83-84 (1949).

240 See FRANKx, FATE AND FR.Fmom 119, 324 (1945); Frank, Book Review,
57 HARV. L. REv. 1120, 1127 (1944).
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should lead to trial court reforms in which most legal
Deweyites have shown scant interest.
Against atomic individualism, Dewey constantly and
justifiably protests. He decries its callousness, its cruel consequences. Yet, at times, he seems to carry his protest
further-to the point of objecting to the acknowledgment
of unique individualities, human particularities. "The world
seems mad," he once wrote, "in preoccupation with what is
specific, particular, disconnected, in medicine, politics, science, industry, education... But recovery of sanity depends
on seeing and using these specifiable things as links functionally significant in a process." 241 Applied to the work of
the courts, this view would tend to over-value the rule aspect
of decisions, to under-value the need of looking for the
unique aspects of lawsuits.
This may account for the absence in Dewey's legal writings of any discussion of a distinction recurrently drawn by
Aristotle.242 Aristotle differentiated "legal" and "equitable"
justice: (1) "Legal justice," he said, underlines an "arithmetical" equality. According to such justice, "it makes no
difference whether

.

.

it is a good or a bad man that has

committed adultery; the law looks only to the distinctive character of the injury, and treats the parties as
equal. .... )) 243 (2) But the "equitable," said Aristotle, although also justice, is a "correction of legal justice," a "better" kind of justice. 4 4 So, considering the litigants, Aristotle
says that the "equitable man.., is no stickler for his rights in
a bad sense, but tends to take less than his share though
he has the law on his side .... 1 245 Again, considering those
who administer justice, Aristotle reaches the same result: 241
241

DE

242

In his writings on ethics, however, Dewey does recognize the evils of

EY, ExPER NCE AND NATURE 436 (1925).

"legalism." See FRANK, CouRTs ON TRIAL 388, 392 (1949).
243 NICOmACHEAN EHics 5.3, 1131 a 30-1131 b 23..

244 Id. at 5.10; 1137 b 27.
245 Id. at 5.10, 1138 a 1-2.
246 RHETORIC 1.13, 1374 b 10-22. See also NIComACHEmAx ETHICs 6.11, 1143
a 19-32, to the effect that "to 'have judgment' is the right discrimination of
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Equity bids us be merciful to the weakness of human
nature. .. not to consider the actions of the accused so much
as his intentions, nor this or that detail so much as the whole
story; to ask not what a man is now but what he has always
or usually been. It bids us ... to prefer arbitration to litigation - for an arbitrator goes by the equity of a case, a judge
by the strict law, and arbitration was invented with the express purpose of securing full power for equity.

I repeat that Dewey by-passes this sort of "equitable
justice" with its sensitiveness to the unique in individual
litigants. This blind spot in Dewey is very probably due
to his inexperience with trials and trial courts, where the
desirability of "individualization" becomes more apparent
than in arguments of appeals and in upper court opinions.14 7

Lessons From Greek Legal Practice:
Because of his attitude, Aristotle highly praised the Greek
practice of arbitration.2 4 With that practice in mind, Aristotle made the statement, quoted above, that the "arbitrator goes by the equity of a case . . . and arbitration was
invented with the express purpose of securing full power for
equity." In China, too, where Confucianism, with its emthe equitable," so that we call "sympathetic judges" those whose judgment "is
equitable" and who are "disposed to make allowances."
Lon Fuller's description of present-day arbitration sounds much like Aristotle's. See FuLE.R, BASic CONTRACT LAW 713 (1946).
Fuller says that the
arbitrator "cannot be driven into a comer by logic, and will be unimpressed by
arguments resting upon the abstract 'rights' of the parties," will "give weight to
factors which seem legally irrelevant, and will find duties which the law does
not dream of, such as that of 'going easy' on a buyer caught by an unfavorable
contract. . . . " Fuller, however, fails to see that, in a law court, the trial
,judge often learns much that is "legally irrelevant" and which, despite the formal
impropriety, he uses when deciding the case.
Fuller, op. cit. supra, at 415-18, does recognize that sometimes judges, to some
extent, are affected by "background facts" concerning business practices in a
certain trade, of which they learn by means that, formally, are "irregular." But
Fuller does not perceive that the same is true of other "irrelevant" facts which
Patterson regards as legally worthless, theoretically irrelevant "gossip?' See
PATTERSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO JTRIsPauDENcE 31 (2d ed. 1946). See also the
first installment of this article, 25 NOTRE DAmm LAWYER 207, 243-45.
247 For a more extended discussion, see FRasx, CouRas ON TRUL 378 et seq.
(1949).
248 NiComACHEAN ETHIcs 6.11, 1143 a 19 et seq.
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phasis on ethics, has inculcated the belief that settlements
of disputes should be highly "individualized," arbitration
has been employed for centuries, and litigation has been
frowned upon. In China, if, despite efforts to negotiate a
settlement, litigation does occur, the judge uses the legal
rules as 'but a general guide, and considers all the unique
aspects of the controversy.249 So, too, (as Aristotle saw)
did the Greek popular courts. Modern writers have often
called the members of those Greek courts "jurors," and have
criticized their actions as if they were the same as our
modern American jurors. But, as Calhoun25 0 and others
have explained, those who sat on those Greek courts had
long experience with, and much knowledge of, the legal
rules, so that the Greek "jurors" more nearly approximated
our judges. Their decisions, compounded of "law" and
"fact," were "gestalts" in which the courts could, and did,
make "equitable" allowance for the unique, individual characteristics of the disputes.
It may well be that we have much to learn from the
judicial process as conducted in Aristotle's Athens. Most
of our legal pundits glorify the legal rules - and then applaud surreptitious methods of evading them, as, for instance, through the general verdicts of jurors wholly untrained in legal affairs 251 (as the Athenian "jurors" were
not). If Dewey had not been tutored by modern legal
thinkers who, as upper court addicts, are obsessively ruleworshippers, he might - through a revaluation of Athenian
justice and of Aristotle's views of "equity" - have urged
that we adopt a frank, not a furtive, "individualization" of
lawsuits.
249

250

FRANx, CoURTS ON TRIAL 381-83 (1949).
CALHOUN, INTRODUCTION TO GREEx LEGAL SciENcE

(1944).

See also

FRANx, CouRTs ON TRIL 379 (1949).
251 See Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. REv. 12, 18-19
(1910); Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of Jury Trial, 12 Am. JUD. Soc. 166,
170 (1929). See comments in Skidmore v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 167 F. (2d)
54 (2d Cm. 1948); Frank, Say It With Music, 61 HaRv. L. REv. 921, 953
(1948); FRANx, LAW AND Tim MODERN MIN 173-74 (1930); FANWX, COURTS
ON TRIAL 127-35 (1949).
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XI.
Theory, Practice, and Reforms
Dewey's thesis about the interaction of theory and practice has sometimes been so interpreted as to support the
glib assertion - of Marxists and non-Marxist economic
determinists - that all valuable scientific theories have
derived from practical social needs. That assertion (with
which I think Dewey disagrees) is demonstrably unfounded.252 Even the judicial administration of justice, an eminently practical affair, has frequently been much improved
by the impact on judges of theories253 - metaphysical, political, economic, psychological, and scientific - which originated with men whose interests were not practical or responsive to the practical social needs of their times, with
men who were engaged in "useless" theorizing. But, in
respect of courts' performances, there remains profound
wisdom in Dewey's thesis if wisely employed: The study of
the legal generalizations we call legal rules and legal principles is arid, sterile, when divorced from observation of the
consequences of the way courts apply - and do not apply
those generalizations in actual practice. Worse, that
divorce prevents the invention of improved methods for
ensuring that, as far as practically possible, desirable legal
rules and principles will be actually applied to the actual
facts in the decisions of specific lawsuits. The grave fault
of Dewey and his legal disciples is that they have perpetuated the divorce, and thus, with respect to the courts, have
sterilized Dewey's teachings.
252 See, e.g., FtANY, FATE AN
FREEnom 49-51, 77, 182-84, 200 (1945);
Frank, The Place of the Expert in a Democratic Society, 16 PHM. or Sc=NacE 3,
11-13 (1949); Clagett, Science and Its History, 18 AimR ScHoLAR 236, 238

(1949).
253 See, e.g., F.nmwANN, LEGAL THEoRY 250-51 (1944); Frank, Book Review, 59 HARv. L. REv. 1004 (1946); cf. Silving, The Unknown and the Unknowable in Law, 35 CALxF. L. REv. 352 (1947). The judges affected by such
theories are often not consciously aware of them.
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Each of the four legal disciples of Dewey whom I have
discussed has made distinguished contributions to legal
thinking - on the upper court level. But all of them by shunning the trial courts, by escaping from the harsh
realities of actual practice in those courts into the relative
quiet of upper court theorizing - have not only diminished
the usefulness of their theories but have also, by their influence on other students of our legal system, blocked that
intelligent observation of its daily operations without which
much needed and long over-due reforms cannot be achieved.
With the gap between legal theorists and legal practitioners,
"important problems tend to fall into oblivion." 25
Among the needed reforms, I think, are these: 5 5 Abandonment of the manner in which witnesses are often bullied
and otherwise interrogated so that their testimony creates
false impressions; the increased participation of government
in bringing into court evidence which one or other of the
parties is unable, for lack of funds, to obtain; the provision
of special training for future trial judges, a training which
will include increased self-awareness of their own prejudices; adequate education for jurors; special training for
prosecutors in their obligation to be fair to defendants in
criminal trials; a revised recruiting and training of our
police (in the manner of the F.B.I.) which will lead to the
disuse of the now widely used "third degree."
One may perhaps hope that, encouraged by Dewey's insistence on the evils of divorcing theory and practice,
younger men will soon undertake such, and other, reforms.
When those younger men read Cook, Llewellyn, Cardozo
and Patterson, they should bear in mind Aristotle's wise
(Dewey-esque) comments that "those whom devotion to
abstract discussions has rendered unobservant are too ready
to dogmatize on the basis of a few observations," 258 and
254 The quoted phrase is from LYND, KNOWLEDGE PoO WHAT? 1 (1939).
422-23 (1949).
255 See FRANK, CouRTs ON TRI
256 ON GENERATION AND CoRRUPTION 1.2, 316 a S.
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that the "true . . . statesmen . . . should be able to find
remedies for the defects of existing institutions." 251
XII.
Aristotle's Rhetoric as a Touchstone
I would not limit my criticism to the legal Deweyites. I
would apply to any systematic legal thinking or legal philosophy this touchstone: Has it come to grips with those characteristics of litigation revealed in Aristotle's Rhetoric? For
most of those characteristics are universal: They inhere in
litigation in every human legal system which can be conceived or which has ever existed - in ancient Greece or
Rome, medieval Europe, modern England, America, South
America, France, Russia, Germany or elsewhere. The same
sort of basic variable human subjectivities, resulting in
grave uncertainties, affect the decisions of lawsuits everywhere, when facts are in dispute, irrespective of the juristic
ideals and dominant moral principles, or of the certainty of'
the legal rules (statutory or "unwritten"), and without regard to the respect paid to precedents, or to the use or
non-use of trial by jury. In litigation, the ideals, the moral
principles, the legal rules, the precedents, are not self-operating but, to a large extent, get their meanings, their practical moral impacts on human lives, in specific court decisions.
Just to the extent, then, that those litigation-uncertainties
exist will it be unknowable to what extent, if at all, the
ideals, principles, rules and precedents have been efficacious
in particular lawsuits. Courts do business at retail, not
wholesale. No matter how noble are the ideals of a legal
system, no matter how splendidly its legal rules embody
those ideals, that system works shocking evils when, because
of its avoidable "unruly" features, its courts sentence men
25T

Poi=ics 3.4, 1288 b 25-1289 a 3.
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to death for murders they did not commit or mulct men in
money damages for acts they did not do.
Tiomists and Aristotle:
Of course, the "broader problems" of legal philosophy,
as Barrett designates them,2 5 also merit exploration. But
irrespective of one's answer to those "broader problems," the
problems concerning litigation, posed by Aristotle's Rhetoric,
will not down. I would suggest to Thomists that, no more
than non-Thomists, can they afford to evade those problems
by insisting on the quest for justice "through impersonalized
rules." 259 For any legal philosophy will be largely futile,
practically, in so far as it does not grapple with those "personalized" problems. Thomists, with their high esteem for
Aristotle, should be among the first to admit that those
problems should be honestly faced.260
Those problems can be honestly faced whether or not one
renounces the belief that there is not "any law other than
civil law or any authority above the State which establishes
and promulgates civil law . .

,,261

Certainly, mere re-

nunciation of that belief will not ensure a facing of those
problems. Nor would those problems be faced and solved
(as far as they can be) merely through the acceptance of
Thomism by every lawyer, legislator, government administrator or executive, juror and judge. Presumably there is
such acceptance in Spain and South Ireland; yet no one
suggests that, in those lands, specific court decisions are
more predictable and just, less subject to avoidable mistakes
of trial court "fact-finding" and litigation-uncertainty, than
in the United States.
258
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A Challenge to Thomisfs:
Thomists, I submit, should meet non-Thomists on this
neutral ground: They should become active participants,
together with decent men of other creeds, in seeking to remove obstacles to the just administration of justice, resulting from the "unruly" elements in the decisional process,
that are practically removable.
Jerome Frank

